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Abstract
The issues faced by law enforcement authorities concerning VoIP are very different from that of traditional
telephony. VoIP provides strong encryption and a decentralised databased network. Wiretapping is not
applicable to VoIP calls and packet capturing is negated by encryption. New methods are required to collect
evidence from systems running VoIP software. This paper presents work in progress and, based on a literature
review of the field, explores a methodology that may be used to advance this research area.
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INTRODUCTION
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology, while still not prominent, is set to radically change the way voice
data is communicated and thus to revolutionise the Australian Telecommunications industry. With the
tremendous growth in popularity and bandwidth of the Internet, technology has emerged that allows phone calls
to be routed over Internet infrastructure rather than the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
infrastructure. The technology, called Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), uses the Internet Protocol (IP) to route
packets containing small portions of voice conversations between the callers.

TELEPHONY
The Internet and the common telephone are two instrumental communication tools in today’s society. These
technologies have vastly different methods of transmitting data between locations, both use a variety of common
media and have a digital architecture but little other similarities. With the tremendous growth in popularity and
bandwidth of the Internet, VoIP technology has allowed phone calls to be routed over Internet infrastructure
rather than the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) infrastructure. VoIP utilises the Internet
Protocol (IP) to route packets containing small portions of audio from the conversations between the callers.
There are several advantages of using a VoIP implementation over a PSTN implementation. This advantage
exists for both the homeuser and large telecommunication companies. Some advantages of using VoIP are
reduced call costs, greater ability to integrate new services and a significant increase in scalability . In contrast,
there are also disadvantages and potential problems associated with VoIP such as lower quality of service,
increased security risks, denial of service and determining physical location of callers .

PUBLIC SWITCHED TELEPHONE NETWORK
The PSTN has evolved from the early days of analogue signals passing through manual switches controlled by
people, to a highly complex and monolithic digital network . The PSTN connects callers through a series of
switches and dedicated lines in what is called a circuit switched network. When a call is established between two
callers, a set amount of bandwidth is reserved for the time the connection is active. In Australia, 64 kbps is
reserved for each active connection. T1 cables are used for most telephone lines which have a maximum capacity
of 1.5 Mbps allowing a total of 24 simultaneous reserved connections . The 64kbps bandwidth was chosen based

on the Nyquist theorem which states that good quality voice transmission is achieved by sampling at twice the
highest frequency on the line .
One of the main problems with PSTN technology is that the 64 kbps of bandwidth is reserved even when there is
no data being sent (e.g. a silence between the two callers) and the entire bandwidth isn’t needed . The actual
requirement for bandwidth is usually only a small amount of what is reserved . Another issue with the PSTN is
that it does not integrate with new features easily . PSTN uses inband signalling, this means that data sent for
the purpose of creating and ending calls (as well as data sent during a call which is not data from the
conversation) is sent in the same frequency as the conversation data . This is illustrated when dialling a telephone
number. When each button is pushed, a tone made by the phone is sent across the line that is then interpreted at
the telephone’s exchange. To develop new services for the PSTN (e.g. caller ID or call waiting), the application
developers have only inband signalling and a small number of other signal mechanisms to use. There are a
number of other techniques for overcoming the small number of signals such as dialling special purpose
numbers, for example a 1800 prefix .

VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL (VOIP)
VoIP is telephony that uses the same technology as that which is the foundation of the Internet; this is a packet
switched network . Packet switched networks differ from circuit switched networks as a set bandwidth is not
reserved for a single connection, in fact, the Internet inherently has no concept of a connection. Small sections of
data, called packets, are sent from the endpoint through a series of routers, each of which forward the packet
closer to its destination. Many different data streams can be sent over the same connections because the
bandwidth is not reserved for one particular stream of data. Essentially, VoIP sends data packets between smart
devices (e.g. computers) over a relatively unintelligent network, whereas traditional telephony sends voice data
between dumb devices (telephones) through a super smart central network .
VoIP telephony is becoming very attractive to users and telecommunication providers alike for a number of
reasons. One of the main reasons is decreased costs . Switching data across a packet switched network is much
cheaper than establishing a circuit over a circuit switched network because less bandwidth is required. Using the
Internet infrastructure is also cheaper as its ownership is not concentrated in a limited number of private
companies. Many organisations, including private companies, Governments, Universities and other
organisations, own and maintain various parts the infrastructure .
VoIP services are often used in conjunction with PSTN by using media gateways. In the case of a PSTN to SIP
network, the media gateways convert the PSTN inband signalling to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) messages
and voice data to RealTime Transport Protocol (RTP) packets (or the other way around if travelling from IP to
PSTN) . SIP and RTP are common protocols used in VoIP implementations and will be discussed further below.
Long distance and international calls benefit from VoIP as the majority of the distance can be travelled via IP
networks and rejoin the PSTN at a local call distance from the target destination. One major telecommunication
company in the United Kingdom is expected convert from a PSTN to an IP backbone by the year 2007.
Customers utilising the company's infrastructure will likely not know the calls are travelling via the Internet .
Telecommunication companies also see VoIP as a method of offering existing customers additional multimedia
services such as videocalls .
Another reason for the increased use of VoIP is extensibility and scalability . VoIP is capable of integrating
almost any feature imaginable. The limitations are in the end devices and protocols rather than in the network (as
is the case with PSTN). With an IP network, inband signalling is not required, separate data streams are used for
data and signalling . To integrate new features within the PSTN network, the complex central switches have to be
reprogrammed which is an involved task .
VoIP telephony relies upon various protocols and methods to establish calls and transmit data. Skype software
uses proprietary protocols that are also encrypted. Many VoIP implementations, however, use SIP and RTP. The
SIP protocol is used for call initiation, call teardown and other call related data sent during the conversation. This
is analogous to the PSTN inband signalling mechanism, Dual Tone MultiFrequency (DTMF). SIP is a text

based application level protocol and relies heavily on other protocols for transport (such as IP and UDP) . VoIP
implementations that use SIP generally rely on a SIP proxy server to which the users must authenticate their
login credentials. This proxy is also used to route call and signalling data. Clients can find each other and
forward SIP messages via this proxy . Communications using SIP are not only used for initiating and to teardown
calls, they are also used for changing call parameters or other features such as integrating more callers into a
conference session. shows the exchange of SIP messages between two clients. It shows the use of SIP registrars
and the proxies which allows callers to create new call sessions. SIP registrars are additional servers used to
locate other users; generally, the SIP proxy also acts as the registrar.

Figure 1 The exchange of SIP messages between two callers
RTP is used for data that is real time in nature. It is not specifically designed for use with VoIP, but rather any
generic data of a delaysensitive nature sent over an IP based network. RTP is transported within UDP packets to
reduce overhead, which leads to greater transmission speed and therefore better call quality. The UDP protocol
does not support the concept of a stream and consequently RTP incorporates sequencing numbers and
timestamps in its packet header to detect jitter and packet loss . Additional mechanisms are also added to RTP to
allow for Quality of Service (QoS) metrics, content recognition and compression.
There are numerous advantages of using VoIP telephony over traditional PSTN technology, but there are
currently issues that affect the viability of the technology. Quality of Service is a measure of the acceptability of
performance from the perspective of the user. The Internet does not inherently support realtime message passing
and traditional applications have not required such constraints. A delay of three seconds would not affect an
email in transit but would have a significant impact on a VoIP phone call. There are three issues which affect real
time data that are not a problem for other data, these are latency, jitter and packet loss . Latency occurs when
packets arrive too slowly from the source and this can cause gaps in conversation. Jitter occurs when packets
arrive out of order and packet loss occurs when packets do not arrive at all (if the packet arrives too late then it
will be dropped and have the same affect as a lost packet) .
The security of VoIP is another major issue, as VoIP must contend with a whole range of threats to which the
PSTN is not exposed. Denial of Service (DoS) (including Distributed Denial of Service  DDOS), subscription
hijacking and eavesdropping are among the more common threats to VoIP . The risks of running VoIP also
extend to the underlying network, protocols and other devices on the network . Issues with VoIP and the
underlying network are an especially complicated problem as VoIP has very different requirements to that of a
data network. Network Address Translation (NAT) routers create problems with routing call data (predominantly
adding latency), whilst firewalls often stop VoIP applications from using dynamic port allocation. Security of the

call data (including call metadata) is another issue with VoIP. Although eavesdropping (packet sniffing VoIP call
packets as it crosses the network) has been negated in many VoIP implementations with strong encryption, a
compromised VoIP device such as a SIP proxy, could collect information about calls such as destinations,
origins, durations and call parameters . In addition to the threats which are faced by VoIP exclusively, traditional
threats to network connected devices such as viruses, spam, unauthorised access and malware all still remain
applicable to VoIP .
Much has been done to protect networks and allow VoIP implementations to be secured. Protocols such as SIP
inherently support encryption and Secure RTP (SRTP) has been developed to add encryption to real time data.
Issues such as DoS can be negated by good network design, as they can with a traditional datacentric network .
Kuhn, Walsh & Fries suggest a novel approach to protecting datacentric networks while integrating a fully
functional VoIP network using the same physical infrastructure. They recommend using two logically separate
networks, with exclusive address blocks, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server and firewalls for
each network. This will allow the networks to have different configurations (especially within the firewall) to
allow for optimal performance and security for each while only having to maintain one physical network. The
logical networks can implement additional measures to stop data flowing between the networks illegally.

CALL INTERCEPTION
VoIP is a developing technology and the social and legal issues surrounding it are still being realised. How VoIP
is affected by legislation that was designed for traditional PSTN telephony is still unclear in many cases. In the
United States, the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) governs the legal
responsibilities of communication providers and the rights of law enforcement agencies. One of the stipulations
of the act requires that all digital switched PSTN telephony switches be wiretap enabled . Bellovon, Blaze &
Landau report that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that VoIP implementations (i.e. non
carrier VoIP) must also comply with CALEA. Although this is ambiguous, it seems that noncarrier VoIP, such
as Skype, is not subject to CALEA where as carrier VoIP must comply (i.e. purpose built VoIP phones which
connect through a VoIP carrier) . The distinction between carrier VoIP and noncarrier VoIP, is that noncarrier
VoIP is regarded as an information service, which is not covered by CALEA . The FCC ruling means that non
carrier VoIP would also have to comply with CALEA and a major overhaul of protocols would need to be
implemented . Forcing noncarrier VoIP to comply with CALEA is a dangerous move as it leaves foreign spies,
hackers and terrorists (as well as the intended government lawenforcement agencies) a method of eavesdropping
thus causing major security implications.

PROBLEM ARISING FROM USE OF VOIP
The popularity of VoIP is increasing as the cost savings and ease of use is realised by a wide range of people and
corporations. The technology is attractive to criminals, especially the noncarrier VoIP, as it often does not
require verification of any details to commence using the service. The security of placing such calls may also be
appealing to criminals, as many implementations use strong encryption to secure both the voice payload as well
as control messages. Skype uses 256 bit AES encryption while Google Talk does not encrypt its payload (but
will support encryption in the future) .
The following hypothetical situation illustrates the ease of which this technology can be used in criminal
activity:
An organised crime ring operates within Australia, distributing illicit drugs throughout the country. The
operators of the crime ring decide that by using Skype software they can anonymously communicate when
necessary. From a criminal perspective, there are several disadvantages of using the traditional PSTN telephone
system. There is the possibility that a law enforcement body could wiretap the connection should they become
suspicious, all calls made and received are logged by the service provider, and using a PSTN phone fixes
someone to a given location (i.e. the physical location of the phone). As an alternative solution, criminals can
use laptops running Skype, create profiles in the same way as a regular user and communicate when necessary. If

law enforcement should investigate, there is no line to wire tap, no call logs and no ability to tie a person to a
specific geographic location. The criminals using Skype can also be contacted or make contact from different
locations, providing flexibility.
Although this particular situation is only hypothetical, it is possible. The smallest through to the largest criminal
organisations, including international terrorists, could potentially communicate using VoIP, as it incorporates the
flexibility of email, the richness of voice and the safety of a decentralised system using strong encryption
algorithms.

RESEARCH IN FORENSIC COMPUTING
Forensic computing is an emerging field of computer science that is currently in a transitional phase that will see
the field mature into a solid and respected science . New technologies are constantly emerging into the
marketplace and the forensic computing field must be vigilant in updating practices and knowledge to account
for such technologies. In recent years, there has been a massive increase in the number of devices with embedded
logic and storage. There have also been remarkable increases in data storage capabilities in household computers,
laptops and dedicated servers. The field of forensic computing must constantly research new technologies as they
emerge, as well as review methods and tools that already exist in order to keep methods, practices and knowledge
up to date. Many common devices have embedded processing and storage capabilities. These devices could
potentially be used during criminal activity and as such, may contain data that could be used as evidence.
Devices such as personal digital assistants (PDA), mobile phones, household computers, laptop computers,
iPod’s, USB storage devices, removable hard drives and other proprietary technologies (e.g. a Blackberry) have
the potential to hold information of evidentiary value that could be used in the course of a criminal, civil or
internal investigation.
Research within the field of forensic computing is multifaceted. New technologies must be thoroughly examined
to determine how they work. This will provide a base for procedures to be developed, allowing a process where
relevant data can be extracted in a forensically sound manner. Developing forensically sound tools with which to
perform this procedure is an important element of the process.
The goal of research in forensic computing is to determine the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the data on the device or
computer. The ‘what’ is to determine what data is relevant and can be used as evidence in an investigation. The
‘how’ is to determine the means of collecting and storing the data. If techniques for extracting and storing data
cannot be proven forensically sound, it will likely loose integrity and becoming inadmissible in a court of law.
Research within forensic computing needs to be versatile as multiple techniques may be required for any
particular situation during an investigation. Forensic computing investigators often face the problem of
encountering live systems, that is, a computer or device that is switched on. Forensic investigations are rarely
conducted using the target system or on original evidence sources . The target system usually needs to be
powered down so that the data on the disk drives cannot be altered, and can subsequently be removed (if
practical), secured, and then entered as evidence. The investigator must consider all factors when deciding
whether to power down the relevant devices. The computer or device may be powered down using a number of
different methods from shutting down normally to removing the battery or plug. If the computer or device is left
on, it may be possible for the investigator to extract information from the main memory, although this is more
likely with a computer than a proprietary device. Tools and methods have been developed to gain information
from memory that is lost once the machine is powered down (e.g. current running processes, memory resident
worms etc) .
Situations often arise in forensic computing investigations that require special procedures or tools because a
particular technology or situation encountered. Forensic computing research requires constant investigation into
new devices and technologies, as well as new methods and procedures for existing technologies. This will equip
law enforcement bodies and other forensic investigators with the knowledge and abilities to allow thorough and
safe investigation of digital devices. It is thus essential that computer forensic research evaluate the use of VoIP
technology and devise methods to allow law enforcement agencies to overcome some of the aspects that are

advantageous to criminals. Wiretapping is not applicable to VoIP communications and therefore other methods
of recovering evidence and information are required.
In his work, Jones (2005) identifies a range of social and technical research questions that focus on the security
and privacy issues through the capture of VoIP packets and logs by diverse technological means. He also
alludes to the corollary to this issue, which is the positive use of such captured packets and logs for either
intelligence or forensic computing purposes.

FORENSIC COMPUTING AND VOIP – POTENTIAL METHODOLOGY
Using Jones (2005) concepts, we turn to memory forensics which is a relatively unexplored area of computer
forensics. There are numerous reasons for the lack of use of this technique but is mainly due to the fact that the
process of imaging the memory is not verifiable. Little investigation into tools and processes for sound memory
dumping techniques has been performed in forensic computing research .
The volatile memory of a system potentially contains tremendous amounts of information about the system
including (but not limited to) open files, active processes, terminated processes and device drivers. This source
of data is lost when the target system is turned off in the course of securing the nonvolatile data sources.
Situations can occur in forensic investigations where a target system cannot be turned off. Servers are a prime
example as downtime generally leads to loss of revenue or essential services. Imaging the memory of a target
machine allows evidence to be collected without any downtime. Imaging memory in general investigations
allows an extra source of data from which evidence can be inferred.
Dumping of the memory from a system requires some method of interfacing with the data. Linux Systems
contain a memory device similar to devices representing hard disks. Memory can be imaged by copying the data
from this memory device . Windows XP does not have an equivalent memory device and must use a section
object to gain access to the memory. A section object allows a mapping to memory pages which can
subsequently be accessed by multiple processes .
Our work in progress thus examines the question “What VoIP related evidence can be recovered from the volatile
memory of a system running VoIP software?”. A number of subquestions have been devised to divide the
research into sections so that each can be focused on individually. Our work is incomplete and still in progress
but we see that these questions can be feasibly answered in the relatively shortterm

CONCLUSION
Imaging memory for forensic purposes is gaining recognition as an area in need of further research. Burdach has
published a number of papers on techniques of finding evidence in both Windows and Linux memory images.
The scope of memory forensics is large because and has potential to add a diverse source of potential evidence.
The lack of research needs to be addressed to promote greater use of such techniques.
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